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AFTER ALVAREZ-MACHAIN: ABDUCTION,
STANDING, DENIALS OF JUSTICE, AND
UNADDRESSED HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS
JORDAN J. PAUST*

As expressed in the Preamble to the United States Constitution, one of the fundamental purposes of the Constitution and,
thus, the creation of constitutional powers was "to... establish
Justice." What is or is not serving ofjustice in particular contexts
can be open to debate, but it is evident from the Preamble that it
is always appropriate to ask whether particular exercises of governmental power (legislative, executive or judicial) are conforming
(i.e., whether they are serving or thwarting justice). Stated differently, it is evident that the express need to "establish Justice"
should condition the exercise of any constitutional power,' especially the practices of our executive officials and the federal judiciary. As James Madison remarked more generally with respect to
constitutionally delegated powers, "[t]he exercise of the power
[delegated by the people] must be consistent with the object of the
delegation."2
It is evident also from our history that the concept and claim
of a "denial of justice," a phrase of some significance under customary international law,' was of great concern to the Founders
© Copyright. All Rights Reserved.
* Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1 Nonetheless, it is not required that justice prevail at the expense of other purposes stated in the Preamble such as the need to assure or promote "domestic Tranquility," "the common defence," "the general Welfare," or "the Blessings of Liberty."
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2 See 3 THE DEBATES IN TIM SEVERAL STATE CoNVENTIONs ON THE ADOPTION OF

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 514 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901) (James Madison in
Virginia in 1788).
3 See, e.g., Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 34-35
(1975), reprintedin RicHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWLmAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTs: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 563, 570-71 (1979); RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF Tr= UNITED STATES § 711 cmts. a-c, e and reporters'
note 2 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; MYRns S. McDoUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS

AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 739-40 (1980) (citing references); Richard B. Lillich, The
Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INiuRIEs TO ALIENS (Richard B. Lillich ed.,

1983); Jordan J. Paust, The Link Between Human Rights and TerrorismAnd Its Im-
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and played an important role in the creation of federal judicial
power.4 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The FederalistPapers:
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for
the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury
ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.
As the denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts,
as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the
just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought
to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other
countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith than to the security of the public
tranquility.5
Writing more recently, Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized:
There is evidence... that the intent of [the drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789] was to assure aliens access to federal courts to
vindicate any incident which, if mishandled..., might blossom
into an international crisis.
... If [there is] a denial of justice .... under the law of nations the United States would become responsible for the failure
of its courts and ... [such] might thereby escalate into an inter-

national confrontation.6
Interestingly, the phrase "denial of justice" has also had a
close association with human rights precepts, at least since the
nineteenth century, and with the right of aliens to an effective
remedy in domestic tribunals.7 It is also significant that, as Chief
Justice Marshall recognized early in our history, our judicial
tribunals "are established . . . to decide on human rights."'
Human rights law now provides the interrelated right of all persons, not merely aliens, to an effective remedy in national tribuplicationsfor the Law of State Responsibility, 11 HASTNGS INDL & CoNp. L. Ray. 41,
50-53 (1987) (citing references).
4 See, e.g., infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
5 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
6 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (1985).
7 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of HumanRight Precepts
in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 543, 615-16 n.479 (1989); supra note 3.
8 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.).
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nals, 9 and quite clearly, it would constitute a denial or perversion
of justice to ignore such rights to an effective remedy. 10 In view of
the above, such a denial would also be inconsistent with the object
of power recognized in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, and
thus, the constitutional exercise of judicial power."
These very basic and understandable points seem lost in recent judicial and textwriter treatments of the question: does an
individual who has been abducted unlawfully from a foreign state
by or at the behest of U.S. federal agents have standing to complain and a right to a remedy in U.S. courts? Under customary
international law concerning the rights of aliens and prohibitions
of a "denial of justice," when such a denial exists or is threatened
the answer must be yes. 2 Under customary human rights law,
based also in the United Nations Charter,' 3 if there is a violation
or threatened violation of the abductee's human rights, the answer must also be yes.' 4 And more generally under U.S. constitutional standards, when one "'personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of
the [Government],' and ...the injury 'fairly can be traced to the
9 See, e.g., Paust, supranote 7, at 611-28. With respect to nonimmunity of foreign
states or officials for violations of the express right to an effective remedy in domestic
tribunals (or international law more generally) as well as the "ultra vires" aspect of
such violations, see generally Joan M. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort
Claims Act of 1789: Lessons from In re Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 67 ST.
JomN's L. REv. 491 (1993); Joan M. Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrierto Human
Rights Litigation-IsAmendment Necessary and Possible?, 86 PRoc., Amd. Soc. INT'L
L. 338 (1992); Paust, supra note 7, at 634-36, 641-42 & nn.578-579, 646 & n.595;
Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: PrivateRemedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 374-78 (1991). Abductions violative of international law,
the law upon which sovereignty and sovereign immunity ultimately are dependent,
are not protectable "sovereign" or official "acts of state," but are (in that sense at least)
"ultra vires." In addition to the materials cited above, see generally Trajano v.
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Marcos-Manotoc
v. Trajano, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993); Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-2448 (9th Cir. July 10,
1989); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988)
(en banc), cert. denied,490 U.S. 1035 (1989); DraftBrief ConcerningClaims to Foreign
Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity for Violations of International
Law Under the FSIA, 8 Hous. J. IN'L L. 49, 54, 59-61 (1985); Jennie Hatfield-Lyon,
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia: An Opportunity for Judicial Enforcement of International
Human Rights Standards,86 PRoc., Azi. Soc. INTL L. 331, 334, 336-37 (1992).
10 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 7, at 613-14 n.476, 615-16, passim; supra note 3.
11

See Paust, supra note 7, at 613-16.
See supra note 3.
13 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 56; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
882 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting Charter guarantees of freedom from torture).
14 See, e.g., supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
12
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challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision,'" such a person should have standing to complain of a deprivation of right. 15 Under the latter standard, clearly if one has,
for example, a human right to be free from illegal abductions, it is
the abducted person who has the closest nexus to the harm, an
actual injury directly related to the illegal action, and a right to a
remedy that, legally, must be addressed and can be "redressed by
a favorable decision." The same is true with respect to an alien
abducted illegally and who is raising a general claim of "denial of
justice" in our tribunals.
These points were generally lost, no doubt, because the recent
and now infamous decision of the Supreme Court in United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 6 and other recent lower federal court opinions'- addressing the general question, did not actually examine
alien claims of "denial of justice" under customary international
law or claims of human rights violations under customary or
treaty-based international law. Instead, they confronted a very
narrow question whether individual standing in the case of an illegal abduction would be proper under a bilateral extradition
treaty."8 Even with such a narrow focus, however, the Supreme
15 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citation omitted) (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976)); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114, 116 (1976); William A. Fletcher, The
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
16 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
17 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991),
vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599
(C.D. Cal. 1990).
18 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193-97; Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d at
1466-67; Verdugo-Urquidez,939 F.2d at 1355-57; Caro-Quintero,745 F. Supp. at 60709. Importantly, the Supreme Court did not address the legality of abductions under
customary international law or other treaties, standing or remedies thereunder, "denials of justice," human rights, the presidential duty faithfiflly to execute such law,
see, e.g., U.S. CoNsT., art. H, § 3; Jordan J. Paust, The PresidentIs Bound by International Law, 81 Am. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987) [hereinafter Paust, President]; Jordan J.
Paust, Correspondence,87 AM. J. INT'L L. 252, 254-256 (1993) [hereinafter Paust, Correspondence];Richard Pregent, PresidentialAuthority to Displace CustomaryInternational Law, 129 MIL.L. REv. 77 (1990), or self-executing treaty tests and related judicial powers. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
760 (1988). Of course, presidential acts in violation of international law cannot be
"controlling" executive acts since acts in violation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution are ultra vires. See Paust, President, supra, at 384-87; see also Trans World
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 261 (1984) (O'Connor, J., opinion)
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Court's majority opinion in Alvarez-Machain provided an appropriate recognition, one in contradistinction to those of the district

court and the Ninth Circuit and to those of certain other lower
federal courts.

At both the district and circuit levels, it was thought that an
abducted person did not have standing under a bilateral extradition treaty otherwise silent as to individual standing. Under such
a view, the individual's rights and standing would only be "derivative" of another state's rights under the extradition treaty and
would therefore require a foreign state to protest the abduction. 19
In contrast, the Supreme Court inAlvarez-Machainnoted that the
treaty "has the force of law, and if... it is self-executing, it would
appear that a court must enforce it on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice of one nation to the
other nation."2 0 In a previous Supreme Court decision, the Court
noted, "[N]o importance was attached to whether or not... [the
foreign state] had protested ...." Of course, more generally, if
an individual has a treaty-based right it remains that of the individual even if the foreign state signatory has a related right and
may pursue or even control or "waive" remedies or sanctions at
(although political branches may terminate treaty, power "delegated by Congress to
the Executive Branch" must not be "exercised in a manner inconsistent with ...international law"); United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S.(15 Pet.) 518, 553
(1841) (successful argument of counsel for individual claimants that "federal executive" does not have "power of making our nation accessories to... atrocious violations
of human right"); see also id. at 595-96 (Story, J., opinion); United States v. Ferris, 19
F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927) (executive seizure in violation of "international law"
and treaty obviates jurisdiction and is "not to be sanctioned by any court"); cf. Louis
Henkin, Correspondence, 87 A i. J. INTL L. 100, 101-02 (1993).
[T]he executive branch is no more free under the Constitution to violate customary law than it is to violate a treaty.
.. In general, it is the Presidents duty to take care that the law be
faithfully executed, and that includes treaties of the United States as well as
customary international law as law of the United States....
The President may have some independent constitutional authority to
take some actions in foreign affairs in which he has independent constitutional autonomy.., even if his action is inconsistent with international law.
Id.; Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty is a Treaty is a Treaty, 33 VA. J. INL L. 51, 66
(1992) ("President is required to give effect to U.S. obligations under international
law, which, of course, includes treaty obligations" and thus, of course, customary international law). But see Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 A1. J. IN'L L. 736, 741-43 (1992) [hereinafter Halberstam, In Defense].
19 See supra note 18.
20 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2195.
21 Id. (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886)).
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the international level.22 It is simply not the case that the only
rights or remedies protected under treaties are those of states or
that individual rights are merely derivative.23 These points are
especially evident when individual claims are based in human
rights law, but there is no apparent reason why individual rights
under a bilateral extradition treaty should be treated differently.
The main question would seem to be whether, with respect to a
particular treaty and practice, such rights can be identified.
Confusion and splits in lower federal court approaches to the
question of standing seem to rest on differing views as to whether
an individual has more than a "derivative" right under an extradition treaty as such. In some cases, claims concerning abductions
or alleged improprieties were thought to be merely "derivative."2 4
22 See generally La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 458,
461 (1899) (even though claims before international commission were those of governments, private company had claim of right under "treaty and the award of the commission," and such right is undoubtedly "susceptible of judicial determination"); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and
InternationalLaw, Continued, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 444, 451, 473-74, 489 (1990); Paust,
supra note 7, at 632 n.539; see also infra note 57; infra notes 97-98 and accompanying
text.
23 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 7, passim; supra notes 3, 8, 13, 22; infra notes 2526, 46, 53-54, 57, 65, 98. But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341,
1352, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992); United States v.
Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
24 See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1235 (5th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); Jaffe v. Smith, 825
F.2d 304, 307 (l1th Cir. 1987); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986); United States v. Cordero, 668
F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980); United States ex rel. Lujan
v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); supra
note 18; see also United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 916 (D.D.C. 1988) (no
abduction, but no foreign state complaint of any sort), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir.
1991). The Yunis court, in a simultaneous opinion pertaining to the defendant-hijacker's other pretrial motions, observed that a
decision to permit the government to bring charges ... should not be regarded as giving the government carte blanche to act as a global police force
seizing and abducting terrorists anywhere in the world. The government
cannot act beyond the jurisdictional parameters set forth by principles of
international law and domestic statute.
Id. at 906; see also id. at n.22 (authority to secure arrest established by Universal
Passive Personality principle and Hijack Taking statute); Id. at 907 (arrest "within
the constraints imposed by international and domestic law"). But cf Exparte Lopez, 6
F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1934) (finding Mexican governmens protest insufficient
regarding abduction by private perpetrators).
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In others, either such claims2 5 or other claims 2 6 under an extradition treaty were found to be ones which an individual has standing to raise. And the new Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
provides room enough for more confusion when rightly recognizing individual standing to raise more general claims concerning
the lack of a state's jurisdictional competence under international
law, 7 and standing to complain of "brutal treatment in the course
of an abduction from abroad,"28 but stating otherwise in connection with a violation of a foreign state's "territorial" rights that

"under the prevailing view the abducting state may proceed to

prosecute" an abducted person absent foreign state objection.2 9
The Restatement adds, however, that this latter and inconsistent
view was "based in part on the principle that only states, and not
individuals, may raise objections to violations of international
law," that this general "principle" has been largely abandoned,
and that many textwriters have criticized the antiquated but "prevailing" viewpoint concerning abductions and violations of "territorial" rights. 30 Indeed, the general principle referred to has been
in error for a much longer period of time than is sometimes real25 See, e.g., United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1987) (where
extradition treaty did not permit prosecution of offenses "other than the offense for
which his surrender was accorded," defendant had standing to challenge such additional prosecution); United States v. Vreeken, 603 F. Supp. 715, 717 (D. Utah 1984)
('The lone exception to the general rule is that the defendant can successfully challenge the court's jurisdiction over his person if he is before the court in violation of an
international treaty."), affd, 803 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1067 (1987).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418-19 (1886) ("rights of
persons growing out of" extradition treaty); Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385, 388 &
n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing cases supporting proposition that standing conferred directly on individual); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,786 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (habeas
review only mechanism by which to challenge extradition), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882
(1986); see also United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1466 n.7 (11th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing debate whether standing to challenge extradition is conferred upon state
or individual), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1027 (1989). Cf In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232,
233-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9511) (discussing judicial authority to adjudicate extradition cases).
27 See RESTATEmNT, supra note 3, § 431 cmt. a; see also infra note 65.
28 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 433 cmt. c and reporters' note 3; see

also id.

§ 432 reporters' note 1. But see id. § 432 cmt. c and reporters' note 2.
29 Id. § 432 cmt. c. But see id. reporters' note 1 and § 433 cmt. c and reporters'
note 3; infra notes 43-44, 46-54, 65.
30 RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 432 reporters' note 2; cf M. CHERiF BAssiouNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN UNrED STATES LAw AND PRACTICE § 2-9 (1983) ("International legal doctrine as expressed in the majority of scholarly writings remains
...
opposed to these practices and to the application of the maxim mala captus bene
detentus."); see also id. § 4-8, § 5-1 ff.
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ized, 31 and its abandonment should compel continued questioning
of the validity of the "territorial" rights focus and the related viewpoint concerning standing in the case of unlawful abductions. In
fact, the territorial rights focus is misdirected. It fails to consider
other individual interests and legal policies at stake and even ignores the question raised in Alvarez-Machain whether a bilateral
extradition treaty can impliedly confer individual rights to be free
from abduction, thereby establishing standing to complain.
Artful argument and articulation of implied terms in extradition treaties may resolve the controversy whether in general or in
a particular instance a nonderivative individual right to be free
from transnational abduction can be implied in a bilateral extradition treaty.3 2 Yet, this need not be the only focus. Quite clearly,
most abductions engaged in merely for purposes of domestic prosecution would result in a "denial of justice" (in the case of an alien
abductee) and a violation of human rights law. Quite clearly also,
the individual victim of such violations of international law must
33
have standing to complain and a right to an adequate remedy
regardless of solutions to issues with respect to bilateral extradition treaties as such or the unlawful use of force in foreign state
territory without foreign state consent.
The whole thrust of the customary prohibition of denials of
justice is to assure that an alien has protection from impermissible harm by the government or those that the government can
control, 4 and that the victim of such harm has access to domestic
judicial tribunals for adequate relief.3 5 When an abduction is unlawful under international law and perpetrated by the government or those it can control, a denial of the protections reflected in
the prohibition of a denial of justice is reached. 6 Additionally, if
the alien victim of an illegal abduction is denied access to domestic
courts and thereby adequate relief and justice, the classic circumstance of a denial of justice has been reached. Since customary
international law is part of the laws of the United States and conSee, e.g., supra note 23; infra note 65.
See generally infra notes 65-88 and accompanying text.
33 See supra notes 3, 7, 9-10, 13; see also BAssIoum, supra note 30, at § 4-11 &
n.32 (person illegally abducted is entitled, at least, to money damages).
34 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 3, at 52-53.
35 See, e.g., id. at 50-51, 53; RESTATEmENT, supra note 3, § 711 cmts. b, c, e, and
reporters' note 2.
36 See RESTATEmzNT, supra note 3, § 711 reporters' note 2; infra notes 40, 42 and
accompanying text.
31

32
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stitutionally-based, 7 and our federal courts have the power and
responsibility to apply customary international law, 8 it is evident
that an individual with a claim under customary international
law to be free from a denial of justice by our government must
have standing to raise such a claim whether or not the interests of
a foreign state, several foreign states, or the entire international
community are also at stake. The same is necessarily true with
respect to claims under customary human rights law.
More generally, the United Nations Security Council has recognized that "abductions are offenses of grave concern to the international community, having severe adverse consequences for the
rights of the victims and for the promotion of friendly relations
and co-operation among States," has condemned "unequivocally
all acts of... abduction," and has recognized the "obligation of all
States in whose territory hostages or abducted persons are held
urgently to take all appropriate measures to secure their safe release and to prevent the commission of acts of hostage-taking and
abduction in the future."39 Clearly, this obligation goes beyond
concern for "territorial" rights of or consent by some foreign state
37 See Jordan J. Paust, Customary InternationalLaw: Its Nature, Sources and
Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INTL L. 59, 77-90 (1990) (citing
references).
38 Id. at 84-86, 89-90 (citing references); Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial
Abductions: America's "Catchand Snatch"Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151,
176, 194 (1991). With such a constitutional, historical base, customary international
law (at least with respect to civil sanctions) has been directly incorporable by the
judiciary (i.e., without the need for implementing legislation). See, e.g., Paust, supra
note 37, at 84-91 (citing references).
39 S.C. Res. 579, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (1986).
Of course, a more famous Security Council resolution in 1960 condemned the Israeli
abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina. See United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting S.C. Res. 138, 15 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S1
4349 (1960)). Unless expectations have changed, such Security Council condemnations of abductions can set limits even with respect to claimed exceptions noted in the
text at notes 55-58. But the exceptions implicate other legal policies at stake that may
not have been adequately considered. Additionally, Article 35 of the 1989 Convention
on the Rights of the Child, G.A_ Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/
25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989), requires signatories to "take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of...
children for any purpose or in any form." Id. Article 1 of that treaty defines "child" as
any human being "below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to
the child, majority is attained earlier." Id. at 1459. As the language of Article 35 declares, there are no exceptions to the prohibition of abductions of children, and thus,
among such treaty signatories such a prohibition would appear to be controlling unless some right to use force in conformity with the U.N. Charter (e.g., the right to selfdefense under Article 51) is implicated, since under Article 103 of the Charter, the
Charter should prevail. See infra note 88.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:551

and is expressly related to "rights of the victims." Further, such
an obligation includes, but is also clearly beyond, prohibitions of
state sponsorship or tolerance of hostage-taking and abduction.
Even an innocent state not initially involved in the illegality can
become responsible for its failure to act to secure the release of
such persons or to prevent illegal conduct in the future. It does
not matter how widespread or rare the illegal acts are once the
state is on notice of such improprieties.
The obligation identified by the Security Council is not unlike
the customary prohibition of a "denial of justice" by states in
whose territory an offender is found or an offense is about to occur;40 nor is it unlike the more general obligation under the

United Nations Charter of all states to take action in order to ensure a universal respect for and observance of human rights. 4 ' In
any event, when a government merely knows, or should know,
that an offense of hostage-taking or abduction of an alien is about
to occur and such government takes no reasonably available preventive action, liability for "denial of justice" can be appropriate. 42
It is worth stressing that this condemnation of abduction by
the United Nations Security Council is important in setting limits
to what otherwise is a fairly open standard. The very concept of
"denial of justice" contains within it two broad criteria that should
be tested with reference to the context and other legal policies at
40 See, e.g., East Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 646, 648-50 (1930); Mead Case
(U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 653, 656-57 (1930); Connolly (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.IA. 387,
388 (1928); Swinney Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 98, 100-01 (1926); Quintanilla
Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 101, 102-03 (1926); Youmans Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4
R.I.A.A. 110, 115 (1926); Janes Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 82, 86-87, 89-91, 94-97
(1925) (failure to apprehend and punish); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 183 (1965); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 711;
George T. Yates I, State Responsibility for Nonwealth Injuries to Aliens in the Postwar Era, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS
213, 231-35 (Richard Lillich ed., 1983); see also Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman,
State Responsibilityfor Injuriesto Aliens Occasionedby TerroristActivities, 26 Am. U.
L. REV. 217 (1977); Wise, Note on InternationalStandardsof CriminalLaw and Administration, in INTERNATIONAL CRnmNAL LAw 135, 152-59 (G. Mueller & E. Wise
eds., 1965).
41 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56; Paust, supra note 3, at 42-43.
42 See supra note 40; see also Janes Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.IA.A. 82, 95 (1925)
("prevalence of lawlessness and the inertness or powerlessness of the authorities near
the scene"). In Quintanilla Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 101 (1926), it was recognized that if prisoners or hostages are taken into governmental custody, the government must "account for them" and "can not exculpate itself"because "thereafter they
have disappeared" or have been found killed. Id. at 103; see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (human rights violation); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 702(c).
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stake. In some contexts, the serving of justice might justify certain means that are not otherwise prohibited. Logically, not all
transnational detentions ultimately deny justice, but one can recognize that denial of an opportunity for those detained to even
make the claim, at least in the country of destination, would constitute an unnecessary denial of justice. Similarly, the treatment
of persons in a given circumstance can reach the level of unnecessary denial, and some forms of treatment are prohibited per se
under other international laws. Ultimate justice, then, does not
justify any sort of means, or restated, some means so taint the
process, that justice, when fully considered, is recognizably
thwarted. Additionally, because of demands and patterns of widespread expectation, in time the fairly open prohibition can become
associated with certain absolutes even if there is no logical explanation for the relation of such absolutes to an open-ended concept
of justice. The concept can take on a particular meaning precisely
because, through time, we prefer that meaning. Moreover, one of
those preferred interrelations now involves human rights.
Are most transnational abductions for purposes of domestic
prosecution also violative of human rights law? As noted, the answer is yes. Early in our history, while justifying the use of force
against Austrian naval power, Secretary of State Marcy proclaimed that an earlier use of force by Austria in Turkish waters
had led to the capture of one Koszta, "not in a fair or allowable
way, but by violating the civil laws of Turkey and the rights of
humanity."43 The "rights of humanity," as proclaimed, undoubtedly included the right to be free from forcible abduction in foreign
territory, and today such rights of humanity arguably exist as
"human rights."'
Whether this is so, it is evident that abductions can violate
modem human rights law reflected in express prohibitions of "arbitrary" arrest or detention of individuals. For example, in 1981
the Human Rights Committee established under the Covenant on

43 See Letter from W.L. Marcy, Secretary of State, to Mr. Hulsemann of Austria
(Sept. 26, 1853), in 1 Message and Documents, 1853-54, at 30, 47 (S. Doc. No. 1, 33d
Cong., 1st Sess.), reprinted in 3 JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
824, 833-34 (1906).
44 See, e.g., Paust, supra note 7,passim;see also Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099,
1107 ("duties of humanity"), 1120 ("rights of man7) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Wilson, J.) (charge to grand jury).
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Civil and Political Rights 45 decided that an abduction by Uruguayan officers of a Uruguayan refugee in Argentina violated the
abductee's human right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.46 The same point has been noted in the Restatement '4 and,
more recently in connection with Alvarez-Machain, by Professor
Lou Henkin.48 More generally, the Restatement has also recog45 See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified in, 1992 U.N.T.S. 171, 31
I.L.M. 645 (May 1992). On the legal effect of various reservations, declarations, and
understandings to this treaty, see Symposium, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. - (1993)
(forthcoming).
46 Views of the Human Rights Committee on the Complaint of Lopez, 36 U.N.

GAOR, Supp. No. 40, at 176-84, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981); see also id. at 185-89; Reed
Brody, The United Nations Createsa Working Group on ArbitraryDetention, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 709, 713 (1991).
47 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 432 reporters' note 1. Other abductions resulting in the disappearance of the victim are covered in RESTATEMENT § 702(c). See

Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
48 See Louis Henkin, "ProfessorHenkin Replies," ASIL NEwsLTErR, Jan.-Feb.
1993, at 6 [hereinafter Henkin, Replies]; see also Henkin, supra note 18, at 101.
Others agree that human rights are at stake. See, e.g., BAssIOUNI, supra note 30, §§ 12 to -3, §§ 4-9 (torture), §§ 5-13 to -34; M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and
IrregularRendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition,7 V n. J. TRANSNATL L.
25, 48 (1973); H. Moss Crystle, Comment, When Rights Fall in a Forest... The KerFrisbie Doctrine and American Judicial Countenance of ExtraterritorialAbductions
and Torture, 9 DiaL J. INTL L. 387, 402-03 (1991); Martin Feinrider, Extraterritorial
Abductions:A Newly Developing InternationalStandard,14 AIRON L. REv. 27, 37, 38
n.85, 40-43 nn.98, 102-03 & 111, 44-46 (1980); Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 474-75,
477, 489; John Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human
Rights from Kidnapping of Suspected Terrorists, 10 HUM. RTs. Q. 193, 205, passim
(1988); Hernan J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping Is Legal, 24 HATINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, passim (1993); Ruth Wedgwood, Remarks, 84 PRoc., AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. 241 (1990). But see Jacques Semmelman, Due Process, InternationalLaw,
and Jurisdictionover CriminalDefendantsAbducted Extraterritorially:The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 513, 517 n.23 (1992) (arguing
that abduction should be expressly prohibited to be covered-which, of course, is not

normal approach regarding this matter). In addition to the problem posed under
human rights standards by the term "arbitrary" (i.e., which arrests or detentions are

"arbitrary" will have to be determined with reference to context), the prohibition happens to be one which can be derogated from under the necessity within democratic
limits test found in most human rights instruments. See, e.g., Symposium, 9 YALE J.
WORLD PuB. ORD. 113 (1982); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29(2). But
see Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 45, art. 4 (allowing derogation
"[in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation" etc.).
It should also be stressed that although the word "arrest" implies action by state

officials, officers, or agents, arbitrary "detention" of individuals in violation of relevant human rights norms could be perpetrated by private actors. More generally,

nearly all of the human rights instruments provided express or implied recognition of
private duties. See Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: PrivateDuties Under

Human Rights Law, 5 HARv.Hum. RTs. J. 51 (1992). By analogy, the "detention" of
aircraft passengers by private perpetrators has resulted in claims of human right deprivations. See, e.g., DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 171
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nized that detention is arbitrary and violative of human rights "if
it is unlawful or unjust,"4 9 adding that our executive officials have
similarly declared that such detention is "arbitrary also if 'it is
incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity of
the human person.'"10 Professor Henkin also stated that "retaining the abducted person, even for trial,... is plausibly 'prolonged

arbitrary detention,' in violation of accepted customary international law,"5 1 and that "[albduction would also appear to be 'cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment' in violation of" human rights
law.5 2 "Prolonged arbitrary detention" is the curious phrase found
in the Restatement,53 but, as recognized in federal court opinions,
both customary and treaty-based human rights law prohibit "arbitrary detention" as such.5 4
The problem for those who prefer a simple rule or flat prohibition of all abductions, however, is that the human rights standard
contains within it its own exceptions. What is "arbitrary," otherwise "unlawful," or "unjust" will have to be considered in context
and with reference to other legal policies at stake. The mere fact
(Eleanor C. McDowell ed., 1975) (United States memorandum regarding aircraft hijacking as "offense against... human rights"). Private kidnappings can also implicate
human rights. But see Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 501-02 (erroneously concluding that only actors "under official authority or under color of such authority may
violate international law"). On the responsibility of private actors under international
law more generally, see Paust, supra note 7, passim (citing numerous references).
49 RE TATEMAN, supra note 3, § 702 reporters' note 6; see also Wedgwood, supra
note 48, at 241 ("Surely one can argue strongly that the right to know the identity of
your arresting agent, the right to know the authority under which he acts, and the
right for it to be a legal, lawful authority is a human right."); supra note 46.
50 RESTATEAEr, supra note 3, § 702 cmt. h (quoting statement of U.S. Delegation, 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.863, at 137 (1958)).
51 Henkin, Replies, supra note 48, at 6.
52 Henkin, Replies, supra note 48, at 6.
53 See RESTATE MET, supra note 3, § 702(e); see also id. cmt. n (noting that such
prohibition reaches beyond custom as such and constitutes one of recognizable "peremptory norms (jus cogens)" which preempts any inconsistent law). On peremptory
norms under customary international law, compare Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird,It's
a Plane, Its Jus Cogens 1, 6 CoNN. J. IN'L L. 1 (1990) with Jordan J. Paust, The
Reality of Jus Cogens, 7 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 81 (1991).
54 See, e.g., De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th
Cir. 1985); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987); SoroaGonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 n.18 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), affd, 654 F.2d 1382, 138890 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13
(9th Cir. 1975), appeal dismissed, 602 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1979); Monroe Leigh, Is the
Presidentabove CustomaryInternationalLaw?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 762-63 (1992).
But see Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964 (11th Cir. 1984) (discussing detention of socalled excluded aliens), affd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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of detention or even transnational detention does not make detention "arbitrary." There must be something more. One factor
might involve lack of consent of the foreign state, but such a factor
is not determinative of what is or is not "arbitrary."
I agree that in most cases each of the human rights prohibitions noted above can be implicated. I do not agree, however, that
every abduction or capture of a person in foreign state territory
without foreign state consent is violative of international law
more generally 5 5 or is necessarily "arbitrary," "cruel," "inhuman,"
or "degrading" within the meaning of relevant human rights standards. For example, it may not be incompatible with principles of
justice, "unjust," "unlawful" or otherwise "arbitrary" to abduct or
capture an international criminal in a context when action is reasonably necessary to assure adequate sanctions against egregious
international criminal activity.5 6 It may not be "arbitrary" or "un55 See, e.g., Halberstam, In Defense, supra note 18, at 736 n.5, 741-43; Jordan J.
Paust, Extradition and United States Prosecution of the Achille-Lauro Hostage-Takers: Navigating the Hazards, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, 251-53 (1987) (citing
references); Paust, Correspondence,supra note 18, at 254; see also Draft Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning State Sponsored Abductions,
presented at a special session at the Mexican Mission to the United Nations, June 24,
1993 (annexed as appendix hereto). But see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56 See, e.g., Statement of Paul Hoffman, lead counsel for Alvarez-Machain, in 79
A.B.A. J. 22 (1993); Paust, supra note 55, at 253 & nn.58-59; Jordan J. Paust, RespondingLawfully to InternationalTerrorism: The Use of ForceAbroad, 8 WHrrria
L. REv. 711, 725-28, 733 (1986); see also United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 907
(D.D.C. 1988) (citing D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in
the United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TFx INT'L L.J. 1
(1988)), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Halberstam, In Defense, supra note 18,
at 744-45 & n.58 ("illegally seized," but should not release accused or obviate jurisdiction); Malvina Halberstam, Correspondence,87 AM. J. INVL L. 256, 257 (1993) [hereinafter Halberstam, Correspondence] ("Whether one who has committed monstrous
crimes against humanity is tried or permitted to escape justice should not depend
solely on the consent of the state that harbored him."). But see supra note 39. For
partly supportive views, see Michael Bazyler, CapturingTerroristsin the 'Wild Blue
Younder'. InternationalLaw and the Achille Lauro and Libyan Aircraft Incidents, 8
WHrrrMR L. Rv. 685, passim (1986) (noting rightly several international instruments did not apply to Egyptian aircrafts flight, article 51 of Charter was not applicable for United States, and United States had claim under doctrines of state responsibility, "hot pursuit," and self-help with respect to Egypt's failure to arrest suspects);
Gregory V. Gooding, Fighting Terrorismin the 1980's: The Interceptionof the Achille
Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INr'L L. 158, 171-72, 175-77 (1987); Jeffrey A. McCredie,
Contemporary Uses of ForceAgainst Terrorism:The United States Response to Achille
Lauro-Questions of Jurisdictionand Its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INTL & CoNaP. L. 435,
459-60, 464-66 (1986) (wrongly using self-defense rationale; arguing self-help rationale); Note, The Achille Lauro Incident and the Permissible Use of Force, 9 Loy. L.A
IN'L & Comp. L.J. 481 (1987); Note, An Analysis of the Achille LauroAffair: Towards
an Effective and Legal Method of Bringing InternationalTerroriststo Justice, 9 FoRD-
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just" to capture a dictator of a country who seeks to retain power
illegally and through acts of violence in violation of the U.N. Charter, customary precepts of self-determination, and human rights
of the citizens of such a country, especially at the request or with
the approval of the lawfully elected officials of such a country.5 7
HAM INT'L L.J. 328, 347, 359-62, 367 (1985-1986). But see id. at 330-32, 362-65, 367;

Gooding, supra, at 163, 168, 170 n.91, 172-73; Malvina Halberstam, Remarks, 86
PROC., A. Soc'Y INVL L. 454 (1992) [hereinafter Halberstam, Remarks] ("no question
that it is a violation of international law... [tihat violation occurred in the Eichmann
case"); Gerald P. McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications for International
Law, 52 TEN. L. REV. 691, 718-21 (1985); Note, Use of Force:Interceptionof Aircraft,
27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 761 (1986). Cf id. at 770.
Senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Paul Simon have offered draft legislation
partly supportive of such an exception. See S.72, A Bill to amend section 481(c) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) ("Sec. 3. Violation of the
Laws of War .... (7) This subsection does not prohibit the capture of any official,
agent or employee of a state during armed hostilities for purposes of bringing such
person to trial for violations of the internationally recognized laws of war."). It would
be useful to amend such a draft to allow capture of "any person" (instead of merely
state officials, agents, or employees) who violates the laws of war, and any person at
any time (not merely during "armed hostitilites") when otherwise reasonably necessary for international criminal law enforcement. S.72 also contains an exception to its
prohibition of abductions if the foreign state is not "exercising effective sovereignty
over such territory" (i.e., its own territory). Id. Sec. 2 (proposed amendment as Section 481(c)(1)(B)). With respect to such an exception, it would be useful to add qualifying language reflecting the necessity and proportionality principles under customary international law, which nevertheless should be utilized as background for
interpretation of the statute. A third exception in S.72 (designed to reflect developments under international law) might read: "(8) This subsection does not prohibit the
capture of any person in accordance with international law." See infra text accompanying notes 94-96. In a letter to members of the American Branch of the International Law Association's Human Rights Committee, Professor Michael Reisman
declared:
[Llawfulness... must be assessed by reference to international policies, the
context that obtains at the moment and the aggregate consequences of the
various options available ....
There may be circumstances in which the abduction of a national of one state from its territory by officials of another
government... may be lawful in international law. I read the Eichmann
incident as one in which the international legal system effectively approved
...[abduction],
adding that the matter is more complicated with respect to "the way... apprehension
of people with regard to whom there is no reasonable cause to suspect that they are
criminals fits into an evolving system of international criminal law." Letter from
Michael Reisman, to members of the American branch of the International Law Association's Human Rights Committee (May 14, 1993) (copy on file with ST. JoHN's LAW
RIVW).
57 See United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See
generally 84 PRoc., Am. Soc'y INTL L. 182-203, 236-56 (1990). Indeed, "consent" of the
lawfully elected government would take the matter outside the general prohibition
based on "territorial" rights. See RESTATaMENT, supra note 3, §§ 432(2), 433(1)(a); see
also Malvina Halberstam, The CopenhagenDocument: Intervention in Support of De-
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And it may not be "arbitrary" or "unjust" to capture an individual
whose present activity forms part of a process of armed attack on
a state in violation of the United Nations Charter and triggers a
right of self-defense in response. 58 Indeed, in the latter circumstance, abduction may provide a less violent and injurious option
than general military strikes or targeting that is otherwise reasonably necessary and proportionate.
Further, if a capture,
arrest, and transfer is conducted as part of an armed activity authorized by the United Nations Security Council under its competence to address threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or
acts of aggression, such a capture may not be "arbitrary" or "unjust" and, in a given circumstance, may be permissible. The same
conclusions may obtain when capture is part of a lawful exercise of
regional power in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
Additionally, the thresholds of cruelty, degradation, or indignity might not be reached in all cases and might well depend upon
mocracy, 34 HARv. INrL L.J. 163, 167-75 (1993); Jordan J. Paust, InternationalLegal
StandardsConcerningthe Legitimacy of GovernmentalPower, 5 Am. U. J. INDL L. &
PoL'y 1063, 1065, passim (1990); Panel, Democracy and Legitimacy-Is There an
Emerging Duty to Ensurea DemocraticGovernment in Generaland Regional Customary InternationalLaw?, in CoNMpoRARY INTERNATIONAL LAw IssuEs: SHARING PANEuRoPEAN A

AmAEmcAN PERSPECTIVES 126-41 (Proceedings of Joint Conference held

in The Hague, 1992). For this reason, the label "abduction" as opposed to arrest or
detention may not be appropriate. Such facts would actually distinguish Noriega from
Alvarez-Machain, not merely the absence of formal protest from Panama after
Noriega's arrest. Moreover, our courts will defer to the Executive in matters concerning recognition of foreign governments. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Yet, the mere fact that the two
governments agree (which solves the "territorial" rights of the state question) does not
resolve the human rights issue, and the question whether an abduction or detention
was "arbitrary" or "unjust" would have to be examined in context. See supra notes 2223 and accompanying text; infra notes 97-98 and accompanying tect. Additionally,
human rights derogations may be permissible where reasonably necessary to stave off
attacks against legitimate self-determination, see supra note 48, which may reach the
level of self-defense, also implicating the next exception. Since international crimes
are committed, the first exception can also apply.
58 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, State Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 749, 755 (1992); Halberstam, In Defense, supra note 18, at 736 n.5 ("Not all abductions are violations of international law. Abduction of terrorists may be justified self-defense under Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter and may thus not be in violation of international law.");
Paust, supra note 56, at 716, 720, 725-26; Pregent, supra note 18, at 104-06. In this
instance, a community's right of self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter
would prevail over human rights claims as long as the responsive action was reasonably necessary and proportionate. See also supra note 48 (legitimate derogations);
supra note 56 (S.72).
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actual treatment of the captured person as opposed to capture per

se. Nonetheless, when human rights of the abductee have been
violated, the rights at stake are clearly those of the individual and
that person must be accorded the right to an adequate or effective
remedy.
Is the remedy of return of the abducted individual always necessary? In some instances, it may not be. When the foreign state
objects to an abduction from its territory, the Restatement recognizes that "international law requires that [the abductee] be returned."5 9 Similarly, the practice of states has often been in accord, 60 but even in the case of a foreign state demand for return
there may be exceptions in extraordinary cases 6 1 and some
textwriters disagree whether the Restatement's proposition
is complete. 2 Indeed, the Restatement suggests that absent
59 RESTATEMiET, supra note 3, § 432 cmt. c; see also id. at reporters' note 3; Richard Bilder, Remarks, 86 PRoc., A. Soc'y INL L. 451, 454 (1992) (adding "a court
should not take jurisdiction"); Joan Fitzpatrick, Remarks, 86 PRoc., Aiu. Soc'Y INT'L L.
452 (1992); Feinrider, supra note 48, at 37, 47; Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102,
121-22 (1933) ("To hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go far
to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty."). But see Halberstam, Correspondence,
supra note 56, at 256-57. The draft legislation S.72, supra note 56, contains the following "sanctions":
(8) A person brought to the United States in violation of subsection (1)(b)
hereof shall not be prosecuted by the United States Government if the state
in which such abduction occurred objects and in the event of such an objection such person shall be promptly returned to the state in which the abduction occurred.
It is unclear from the draft whether mere objection is the test or whether a foreign
state objection can be second-guessed in terms of the legislative scheme and its exceptions. Presumably, the language "brought to the United States in violation" and
"such" abduction conditions the circumstance in which a foreign state protest operates, since one exception is contained within subsection (1)(B) and the other (the war
crimes exception) is contained within subsection (7) of the overall amendment. See
supra note 56. Yet, clarity would help.
60 See, e.g., Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1907); Cosgrove v. Winney,
174 U.S. 64, 69 (1899); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886); RESTATEAmrNT, supra note 3, § 432 reporters' note 3; 1 M. CHERIF BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL

EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAw AND PRACTICE § 5.4, at 235-37 (2d ed. 1987); 4
MooRE, supra note 43, § 603; JoHN B. MooRE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION § 190 (1891); Ruiz-Bravo, supra note 48,
61 See, e.g., supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.

at 870; infra note 65.

62 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 58, at 750; Halberstam, In Defense, supra note
18, at 737 & n.7, 738-40, 744-45; Halberstam, Remarks, supra note 56, at 453-54;
Halberstam, Correspondence, supra note 56, at 256-57; Alan Kreczko, Remarks, 86
PRoc., Am. Soc'y INTL L. 454 (1992). Of course, new circumstances might arise where
the individual actually seeks asylum or refugee status and freedom from forced return
under other international laws.
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protest from the foreign state the remedy of return may not be
required.6 3
In my opinion, adequacy of remedies must be considered in
context with reference to all relevant legal policies at stake. It
might be that with respect to more ordinary abductions the remedy of return will be appropriate whether or not a foreign state
protests the abduction. In fact, given the conclusion that a particular abduction violates the human rights of an abductee and such
rights are those of the individual, it seems nearly irrelevant
whether a foreign state also objects. Yet, in a given case, the lack
of a demand for return may point, however indirectly, to some underlying rationale, based on an extraordinary set of circumstances, for denial of the remedy of return. In the complexities of
circumstance, such a refusal to object might reflect at least one
state's notions of justice (at least with respect to such a remedy),
but I would stress that in no way should foreign state refusals
simplistically constitute the "waiver" of individual claims.6 4 No
single litmus test should preclude judicial inquiry into the appropriateness, the justness, of particular remedies. Here, reasonable
people might disagree about appropriate remedies, but that precisely is the point.
Having demonstrated that most transnational abductions for
purposes of domestic prosecution will result in a "denial ofjustice"
(in the case of an alien abductee) and a violation of human rights
law (both involving a violation of customary international law), it
is worth revisiting the question whether these customary prohibitions could also be read into the meaning or constitute implied
terms of an extradition treaty. Importantly, the Supreme Court in
Alvarez-Machain did not address individual claims of "denial of
justice" or human rights deprivations. A more general prohibition
under customary international law (mirrored in the U.N. Charter)
was argued with respect to the background of the extradition
treaty and allegedly implied terms, one prohibiting the exercise of
governmental or "police" powers in a foreign state without foreign
state consent.6 5
63 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 432 cmt. c and reporters' notes 2-3; see also
Henkin, Replies, supra note 48, at 6.
64 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
65 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96; id. at 2197, 2201-02, 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the general prohibition, see, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 362, 370-71, 376-79 (1824); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d
62, 66-68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Toscanino, 500
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F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974); Motherwell v. United States ex rel. Alexandroff, 107
F. 437, 446 (3d Cir. 1901) (Gray, J., concurring), rev'd, 183 U.S. 424 (1902); Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (stating entry into Mexico
would be "a violation of Mexican territory contrary to the law of nations in the absence of consent of the Mexican Government"); Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson
(in 1793), in American State Papers, 1 FoREIGN RELATIONS 150 ("It is the right of
every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other within
its limits...."); S.S. Lotus (Turk. v. Fr.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18; Opinion
of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on Alvarez-Machain, O.A.S. CJI/Res. H15/92, Aug. 15, 1992, reprinted in 13 H.R.L.J., No. 9-10, at 395 (1992); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 3, §§ 432-433, 472, reporters' note 2; 5 MARJORiE M. WHrrzEmN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 183 (1965); GEOFF GIBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAw 190
(1991); 1 LASSA F. OPPENHEmI, INTERNATIONAL LAw 295 & n.1 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955); Abramovsky, supra note 38, at 176, 191, 194, 209; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
InternationalExtraditionin American Practice and World Public Order, 36 TENN. L.
REv. 1, 11 (1968); Feinrider, supra note 48, at 28-29; Glennon, supra note 58, at 74647; Halberstam, Remarks, supra note 56, at 454; Louis Henkin, Remarks, 84 PRoc.,
Am. Soc'Y IL
L. 236-37 (1990); Louis Henkin, "Will the U.S. Supreme CourtFail
InternationalLaw?," ASIL NEWSLETTER, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 1; Leigh, supra note 54,
at 762-63; Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 451, 472-73, 489; Pregent, supra note 18, at
95, 97, 104, 106; Lawrence Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob KidnappingCase (Switzerland-Germany), 30 A. J. INT'L L. 123 (1936); Semmelinan, supra note 48, at 551-52,
571; see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1933) (illegal seizure of
vessel voided); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927) (executive violation of
treaty abroad would distinguish Ker per jurisdiction); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900) (illegal seizure of vessel voided); Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808), overruled by Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S.(6 Cranch) 281 (1810); United States v. Ferris, 19
F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1797); supra note 43; infra
note 83; cf. Hudson, 10 U.S.at 284 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting); Edward Gordon, Remarks, 84 PRoc., Am. Soc'y INT'L L. 242-4 (1990). Clearly, individuals had standing
to present these claims of illegal force under customary and/or treaty-based law.
It should be noted that, under international law, a foreign flag vessel is the
equivalent of foreign state territory. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137,
155-59 (1933); United States v. Crews, 605 F. Supp. 730, 736 (S.D. Fla. 1985); S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927); cf RESTATEmENT, supra note 3,
§ 402 reporters' note 4. Thus, the exercise of police powers on a foreign state vessel
without foreign state consent (i.e., consent in advance by treaty, tacit consent under
relevant customary interational law, or ad hoc consent) raises similar legal problems.
However, despite concerns of counsel, see Gail D. Cox, Court OKs Reach of INS
Abroad, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at 3, 29, the recent Ninth Circuit case, United
States v. Chen, No. 92-50210 (9th Cir. 1993), apparently did not involve federal activity on a foreign flag vessel, but merely activity on a U.S. vessel otherwise on the high
seas. The Supreme Court's decision in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W.
4684 (1993) did not address federal activity on foreign flag vessels as such, but there
was consent from the Haitian government by international agreement for U.S. interdiction activities. See id. at 4685. Curiously, what the Supreme Court also did not
address was whether federal acts on U.S. flag vessels were acts within the equivalent
of United States territory for purposes of application of relevant treaty obligations. In
this sense, the Supreme Court "missed the boat." The point has been made in a lower
federal court opinion. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1515
(11th Cir. 1992) (Hatehett, J., dissenting).
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In the majority's view, such a precept does not "relate[ ] to the
practice of nations in relation to extradition treaties,"66 and to infer its inclusion "goes beyond established precedent and practice."67 The majority reasoned that a violation of such a principle
of customary international law is "of little aid in construing the
terms of an extradition treaty"68 and would not necessarily constitute "a violation of this particular treaty."6 9 Moreover, the Court
stated that "to imply from the terms of this Treaty that it prohibits obtaining the presence of an individual by means outside of the
procedures the treaty establishes requires a much larger inferenlarger than the less-than-nimble majority would
tial leap" 7 0-one
recognize-and such principles "simply fail to persuade us that we
should imply... a term prohibiting international abductions."7 '
The Court's inability to imply a well-understood prohibition under
customary international law is, to say the least, quite bothersome
72
in view of the holdings and rationale of the courts below in this
and a related case 73 and, indeed, in view of the well-reasoned dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens. 74 The existence of such a prohibition as a logical and well-understood background to the extradition treaty, coupled with the overall purpose of extradition
treaties, compels a more logical and common sense approach to
interpretation. But "[t]he Treaty says nothing about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions," the majority argued,7 5 and the purpose alleged was, for
not sufficient to contain an implication to the
the majority,
76
contrary.
66 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195. But see Dominguez, 90 Tex. Crim.at
98-99 (customary prohibition of U.S. abduction of bandits in Mexico is one of "the
implied limitations upon it under its treaty [of extradition] with Mexico" (emphasis
added)); infra note 83.
67 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196. But see infra note 83.
68 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2196 n.15. But see supra note 66; infra notes 7274.
69 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196 n.14. But see supra note 66; infra notes 7274, 83.
70 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2196.
71 Id. But see supra note 66.
72 See the lower court opinions in Alvarez-Machain at 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67
(9th Cir. 1991), and 745 F. Supp. 599, 609-10, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
73 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349-55, 1362 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 112 S.Ct. 2986 (1992).
74 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. at 2197-2203, 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 2193.
76 Id. at 2196 n.14.
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Commentators disagree whether such a prohibition should
have been implied,77 but the majority opinion seems conclusory,
result-oriented, illogical, and ultimately bizarre. The purpose of
extradition treaties is relevant.7 8 The customary prohibition of
abductions is also relevant and "of aid" in interpreting an extradition treaty addressing the means of acquiring custody of an individual.79 In addition, the absence of a clear "practice" specifically
tied to extradition treaties as such would not be surprising in view
of the well-known prohibition of abductions under customary international law and the lack of a previously known claim by any
government that such prohibitions should not be implied-the
80
sort of claim that the district court below found to be "absurd,"
the Ninth Circuit in a related case found to be "simply mak[ing] no
sense whatsoever,"8 1 and Justice Stevens in dissent found to be
77 Compare Halberstam, In Defense, supra note 18, at 737, 744-46; Halberstam,
Correspondence,supra note 56, at 256-57; Jacques Semmelman, InternationalDecisions, 86 Ari. J. IN''L L. 811, 816-17 (1992) with Abramovsky, supra note 38, at 176;
Bilder, supra note 59; Valerie Epps, ForcibleAbduction, JurisdictionAnd Treaty Interpretation,International Practitioner's Notebook, No. 55, at 6-7 (Am. Branch, I.LA4.
Oct. 1992); Glennon, supra note 58, at 748; Henkin, supra note 65, at 1-2; Leigh,
supra note 54, at 762-63; Paust, Correspondence,supra note 18, at 255; Ruiz-Bravo,
supra note 48, passim.
78 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 31(1),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289 (1969) ("in light of its object and purpose"), reprinted
in 8 I.L.M. 679, 692 (1969); Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2198 & n.4, 2199, 2201
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 317 (1907); United States
v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 420 (1886) ("the entire face of the treaty"); id. at 422 ("the
manifest scope and object of the treaty itself"); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
939 F.2d 1341, 1349-53 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992); RSTAmMENT,
supra note 3, § 325(1); BAssiouN, supra note 60, at 89; Abramovsky, supra note 38, at
176; Bilder, supra note 59 ("The whole purpose of the extradition treaty is to regularize this process and to prevent people snatching people from other countries.. .. ");
Epps, supra note 77, at 6; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Comment, Still More on Kidnaping,
85 Am. J. INT'L L. 655, 658-59 (1991); Ruiz-Bravo, supra note 48, passim; see also
Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1920) (discussing need to effectuate purpose of
treaties); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 57 (1903) (discussing need to fulfill "manifest
purpose" of treaties).
79 See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. passim (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1352, 1354; Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 92, 9899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (quoted supra note 66); Abramovsky, supra note 38, at 176;
Hatfield-Lyon, supra note 9, at 336; infra note 84.
80 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 745 F. Supp. 599, 610 (C.D. Cal. 1990),
affd, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
81 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1351; see also id. at 1346, 1350; Abramovsky, supra note 38, at 176; Epps, supra note 77, at 6-7 (noting claim "makes no sense
... [and] strains credibility beyond the limit"); Henkin, supra note 65, at 1 ("hard to
believe"); Lowenfeld, supra note 78, at 661 ("Government's arguments... makes [sic]
no sense... such embarrassing pleading. .. ."); Andrew L. Wilder, Note, United
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"shocking" and ultimately "monstrous."8 2 Moreover, in this case
there was a relevant "practice" between the United States and
Mexico confirming beyond reasonable doubt the shared expectations of both countries that abductions would constitute clear violations of prior extradition treaties between the two,8 3 and there is
simply no logical reason why such a shared view was not retained.
More generally, customary international law and relevant
multilateral treaties are appropriate aids for interpreting bilateral treaties.8 4 Although the use of international law as background for interpretation has found acceptance in a long line of
United States cases, 8 5 such an approach to interpretation seems
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 979, 986-87, 993 (1992) ("contrary to
common sense... ridiculous"); David 0. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance: U.S. Feels
Heat for Ruling That Permits Government Kidnapping, 78 A.B.A. J. 50 (1992). In its
brief before the Court, Canada took a far more restrained but apt position with respect to the U.S. executive claim involved, noting that "it departs as well from common sense underpinnings of all such treaties" and that "[clivilized nations do not endorse the principle advocated by petitioner." Brief of the Government of Canada as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712).
82 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201-02, 2205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting The Apollon, 22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824)); see also Ruiz-Bravo,
supra note 48, passim.
83 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191, 2197 & n.1, 2199 & nn.14-15 (present
interpretation and protests by Mexican government); Letter from T.F. Bayard, Secretary of State to T.C. Manning (Feb. 26, 1887), in DIPLOMATIC INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1801-1906; 4 MOORE, supra note 43, § 204, at 276; Letter from
J. Blaine, Secretary of State to Governor O.R. Roberts of Texas (May 3, 1881), in 4
MooRE, supra note 43, § 603, at 330 and in DOMESTIC LEmRS OF THE DEPARTmENT OF
STATE, 1784-1906, quoted in Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1354; Letter from Charg6
B. Davalos to Secretary R. Bacon, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, H.R. Doc. No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1121 (1906), quoted in
part in Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194 n.11; Fitzpatrick, supra note 59, at 452;
Ruiz-Bravo, supra note 48, at 859 n.163; see also Dominguez, 90 Tex. Crim. at 98-99
(quoted supra note 66); cf Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194 & n.11 (noting that
United States did not disagree and would extradite abductors, but U.S. unilateral
view and/or executive action with respect to jurisdiction and remedy were controlled
by Supreme Court decision in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)); id. at 2204 n.30
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
84 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 78, art. 31(3)(c)
("any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties"); Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197, 2201-02, 2203 n.27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); LuNG-cHu CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 27880 (1989); MYR's S. McDoUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 29-30, 44, 62, 105-06, 260-61 (1967); 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note
65, at 952-53; JOSEPH G. STAmRE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 478-81
(10th ed. 1989); supra note 79; infra note 85.
85 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10, 20-21 & n.12 (1963); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931); Geofroy v.
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simply to have been ignored by the majority opinion.86 Also, it is
logical to consider a bilateral extradition treaty in view of the
United Nations Charter's prohibition of abductions8 7 not merely
because the Charter is a relevant multilateral treaty, but also because, under Article 103 of the Charter, 8 Charter obligations
must prevail in the event of an unavoidable clash with any other
treaty, and thus must logically be considered as background and
opposed to bizarre interpretations favoring illegality.8" Indeed,
"silence" in a bilateral extradition treaty concerning matters covered and guaranteed by the United Nations Charter is not merely
understandable, 90 but also cannot logically be used to even set up
the sort of clash between a bilateral treaty and the U.N. Charter
in which the Charter ultimately must prevail.
In view of the above, a general prohibition of transnational
abductions should have been implied by the Court in AlvarezMachain with respect to the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty. The
remaining question concerning whether an individual has standRiggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890); Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1886); United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20, 429 (1886); The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
518, 594-95 (1841); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 246 (1817); Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 223-28, 239, 261 (1796) ("The subject of treaties... is to be determined by the law of nations."); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101 (C.C.D. Pa.
1793) (No. 6360); see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S.
694, 698-703 (1988) (use of foreign treatises); INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
438-39 & n.22 (1987) (use of U.N. document); Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 261 (1984); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Tucker v.
Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902); Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in
Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 490 (1823).
86 Compare Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct at 2195-96 (Rehnquist, C.J.) with id. at
2197, 2201-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87 See, e.g., id. at 2201 & n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Verdugo-Urquidez, 939
F.2d at 1352; Glennon, supra note 58, at 747-48; Ruiz-Bravo, supra note 48, passim;
Wilder, supra note 81, at 989; supra note 55. Charter prohibitions of two sorts are
relevant: (1) concerning the use of "force," see supra notes 55, 65, and (2) concerning
human rights. See supra notes 13, 41, 45-54; see also supra text accompanying note
39.
88 U.N. CHARTER art. 103. Article 103 reads: "In the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under
the present Charter shall prevail." Id.
89 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201 & n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Glennon, supra note 58, at 748; Paust, Correspondence,supra note 18, at 255; Ruiz-Bravo,
supra note 48, 852.
9o See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201 & n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("It is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty might believe that it has secretly
reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in the other party's territory.");
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1354.
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ing under the bilateral treaty could have then been addressed,
and it is certainly possible that an individual's separate claims of
"denial of justice" or human rights violations could have formed
the basis for an implied right to be free from abduction, even
under the extradition treaty.9 1 In any event, such reasoning is not
necessary given the fact of individual standing and the right to a
remedy for denials of justice and violations of the victim's human
rights. Additionally, in the actual case, the complaint by Mexico
concerning a violation of the extradition treaty was sufficient to
allow standing even under a "derivative" rights theory.
Also, in the actual case, no exception would have existed with
respect to: (1) persons reasonably accused of having committed international crimes (especially since Mexico was willing and able to
prosecute, had breached or denied no relevant international obligation, and posed no threat relevant to the necessity for abduction), (2) persons similarly accused of crimes against self-determination (and in this case the Government of Mexico did not approve
of the arrest by U.S. agents), (3) persons involved in armed attacks against the United States implicating in any way a right of
self-defense under the United Nations Charter, or (4) action authorized by the U.N. Security Council or a regional organization.
This was merely an ordinary circumstance 92 posing no extraordinary exception, but resulting in an extraordinarily poor reading of
a bilateral extradition treaty.
With respect to congressional response, legislation in this
area is not actually necessary since the President has a constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law, including international
law, 93 but new legislation could be useful to reinforce the general
prohibition of abductions under international law, to send a
message to those within the executive branch who still dare to assert that the President is above the law, and to assure adequate
91 If there had been enough evidence to pursue prosecution (there was not-see
Don J. DeBenedictis, Scant Evidence FreesAbducted Doctor, 79 A.B.A. J. 22 (1993)),

this abduction might have been more unlawful than arbitrary, more arbitrary than
unjust, yet still more ordinary than extraordinary in the sense identified above.
92 More generally, rights certainly can be implied from treaties under well-recognized tests. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) ("Wihenever its
provisions prescribe a rule by which the rightsof the private citizen or subject may be
determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court .... "
(emphasis added)); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809)
("Whenever a rightgrows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is... to be protected."
(emphasis added)).
93 See supra note 18.
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civil and criminal sanctions against those who order or participate
in abductions violative of international law. Such legislation need
not be complicated. 4 Like several other statutory approaches incorporating international law, new legislation could incorporate
such law by reference.9 5 A new statute might simply begin: "Any
person who orders or participates in an abduction of any person in
violation of international law, when the accused knew or should
have known that the abduction would be violative of international
law, shall be liable to..."
[list criminal and/or civil sanctions].
The language in such legislation would necessarily include any exceptions under international law and could thereby avoid complicated drafting schemes attempting to articulate every possible exception under international law now and in the future. Thus also,
it provides a useful flexibility in case of changes in international
96
standards, much like legislation incorporating the laws of war.
94 Cf Glennon, supra note 58, at 753, 755 (discussing possible congressional response to Alvarez-Machain). Portions of a current draft (S.72) are quoted supra note
56.
95 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1993); 10 U.S.C. §§ 818,
821 (1993). Such incorporation by reference is constitutionally sufficient. See, e.g., Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1942); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
162 (1820); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980); Jordan J.
Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime JurisdictionOver Civilians in Federal
DistrictCourts, 50 TEx. L. Rav. 6, 10-12 (1971), reprintedin 4 THE V=TAi WAR AND
INTERNATioNAL LAw 447, 451-53 (Richard Falk ed., 1976). Congressional power with
respect to such legislation exists under Article I, Section 8, clauses 10 and 18 of the
U.S. Constitution.
96 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821 (1993); supra note 95. On June 8, 1993, the Human
Rights Committee of the American Branch of the International Law Association
adopted the following resolution:
The Human Rights Committee of the American Branch of the International
Law Association,
Alarmed at prior tolerance by the Department of Justice of transnational
abductions in violation of international law;
Noting that under our Constitution the President and all executive officers
and agents are bound faithfully to execute the law, including international
law;
Applauds the efforts of those in the United States Congress to assure that
the Executive branch engages in lawful law enforcement abroad; and
Hereby recommends:
1. That any future legislation in this regard incorporate international law
by reference (as in 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821; 18 U.S.C. § 1651; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350), and thus allow flexibility in case of changes or exceptions under
international standards; and
2. That Congress consider adopting one or both of the following as
legislation:
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A different form of legislation might merely seek to assure
that executive compliance is forthcoming. Such legislation could
read: "No federal or state official, officer, or agent shall knowingly order or participate in an abduction of any person in violation of international law." Additionally, Congress may wish to
emphasize such a prohibition in legislation authorizing U.S. participation in an important and growing area of concern, that involving transnational international criminal law enforcement.
Congress might wish to condition such participation through legislation as opposed to leaving developments in this area to ad hoc
executive practice. A statute of this sort might begin as follows:
22 U.S.C. § 1733
InternationalCriminalLaw Enforcement Act
(a) The President of the United States is hereby authorized
to engage or participate in or direct extraterritorial law
enforcement efforts in foreign state territory:
(1) when the foreign state has consented to such enforcement efforts; or
(a) "No federal or state official, officer, or agent shall knowingly order
or participate in an abduction of any person in violation of international law."
(b) "Any person who orders or participates in an abduction of any person in violation of international law, when the accused knew or
should have known that the abduction would be in violation of international law, shall be liable to... [specify criminal and/or civil
sanctions, which may distinguish between federal officials, officers
or agents, on the one hand, and all other persons, on the other
hand].
3. Alternatively, that Congress should consider adopting the following as
an amendment to current drafts:
"This subsection does not prohibit the capture of any person in accordance with international law."
4. Additionally, that Congress should consider adopting in relevant
legislation:
"The United States recognizes the human rights of all persons not to be
removed from their country against their will except as international
law permits."
Members of the Committee were: Charles D. Siegel, Chair, Robert Bard, Thomas Buergenthal, Lung-chu Chen, Anthony D'Amato, Joan M. Fitzpatrick, Thomas M.
Franck, Claudio Grossman, Sofia Gruskin, Hurst Hannum, Louis Henkin, Paul L.
Hoffman, Farrokh Jhabvala, Nina Lahoud, Sidney Liskofsky, Bert B. Lockwood,
Steven Marks, David A. Martin, James A.R. Nafziger, Ved P. Nanda, Jordan J. Paust,
Mark A. Roy, Prakash S. Sinha, W. Michael Roisman (who agreed that "persons may
be captured by government agents acting under color of national authority when such
capture is in accord with international law"), and Malvina Halberstam (dissented).
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(2) when such efforts are reasonably necessary and proportionate to assure enforcement of international
criminal law and such action is otherwise permissible under international law.
(b) As used herein, the phrase "international criminal law"
is meant to include, at a minimum, coverage of the following crimes recognized under customary or treatybased international law (and incorporated herein by
reference):
(1) genocide;
(2) war crimes;
(3) crimes against self-determination, aggression
against authority, or politicide;
(4) crimes against human rights;
(5) hostage-taking;
(6) attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, spacecraft, or
merchant vessels;
(7) piracy; and
(8) slave trade.
(c) As used herein, the phrase "consented to" is meant to include consent in advance by international agreement or
by implication under customary law and ad hoc consent
of a foreign state.
CONCLUSION

When abductions occur in violation of international law, customary prohibitions of "denials of justice" and human rights violations, as well as more general principles of justice, demand recognition of individual standing and the right to an adequate remedy.
Clearly, "territorial" and "derivative" rights are not the only rights
at stake. Yet, because of the various interests of the individual,
the state, and the international community, as well as the various
legal policies at stake, not all transnational abductions should result in violations of international law. Certain extraordinary circumstances involving reasonably necessary international criminal-napping, acts of self-defense under the United Nations
Charter, or permissible actions under Chapters VII and VIII of
the U.N. Charter pose reasonable exceptions to a flat prohibition
of the use of force to arrest persons in foreign territory without
foreign state consent. Nonetheless, absent such extraordinary circumstances, transnational abductions recognizably constitute vio-
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lations of several international norms, including those providing
relevant rights of the individual victim of an abduction, and such
rights remain those of the individual.9 7 They are neither "derivative" of nor ultimately waivable by the state. Indeed, they are
rights erga omnes, owing by and to all humankind. 9 8
With respect to the claimed exceptions in extraordinary circumstances, all of this assumes an executive branch willing to
abide by customary and treaty-based international law, and thus
the mandate of Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution,9 9 and an executive branch capable of making fine point distinctions with respect to the context and relevant legal policies at
stake. When it becomes evident that this is not the case, when the
executive claims to be above the law and able to act in lawless
disregard of its duty under the Constitution, the need for judicial
review,100 indeed judicial supervisory power, 10 1 becomes all the
more necessary in a free society. Claims concerning standing, denials of justice, and human rights take on far greater import in
the face of executive claims that its illegalities should be controlling. Ultimately, this quest for unbounded power threatens much
more than law and justice or our own rights and liberties. 0 2 Ultimately, this quest for power uncontrolled by law is subversive of
constitutional democracy.
I fear not this evil, for despite momentary setbacks and flirtations with a postulated presidential power to violate the law of the
land, I am confident that our generally shared commitment to law
is preferable and I am optimistic that it will prevail.
See supra notes 22-23, 57 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights: From JurisprudentialInquiry to Effective Litigation, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 227, passim (1981); supra notes 7 & 9.
99 See supra note 18.
100 See Henkin, Correspondence, supra note 18, at 101-02; Jordan J. Paust, An
Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CoNN. L. REV. 697,
passim (1987); supra note 18; infra note 101.
101 See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d
Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-79 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745
F. Supp. 599, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Crystle, supra note 48, at 406-07; Henkin, Correspondence, supra note 18, at 102; see also United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896,
906-07 (D.D.C. 1988) (quoted supra note 24), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 791, 798-99 (D. Kan. 1980), affd, 654 F.2d
1382 (10th Cir. 1981); supra note 18.
102 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2201-03, 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Paust, supra note 100; supra note 18.
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AFTER ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
APPENDIX

(from the presentation of Professor Jordan J. Paust at
the Mexican Mission to the United Nations,
June 24, 1993)
Draft
Declarationon Principlesof InternationalLaw Concerning State
Sponsored Abductions
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
Consideringthe principles of international law concerning the
use of force and impermissible intervention in foreign state territory reflected in the United Nations Charter and in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations,
Alarmed at the use of transnational abductions to obtain custody of those accused of domestic crimes,
Affirming that customary human rights law guaranteed also
by or thru the United Nations Charter prohibits the arbitrary
arrest or detention of persons,
Recognizing that the Convention on the Rights of the Child
prohibits the abduction of children,
ConsideringSecurity Council Resolution 138 of 23 June 1960
(concerning the abduction of Adolf Eichmann) and Security Council Resolution 579 of 18 December 1985 (condemning all acts of
abduction),
Hereby Proclaimsthe following principles:
1. No State has the right to use, participate in, or authorize
the use of force or police power in any other State in connection
with transnational abduction without the consent of such other
State or unless it is otherwise permissible under international
law.
2. Abductions which are arbitrary under the circumstances
constitute violations of the human rights of the abducted persons,
are impermissible, and require appropriate domestic or international remedies.
3. Whether or not abduction or capture is permissible under
international law must be considered in light of relevant legal policies at stake and all the circumstances of each particular case,
including:
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(a) whether such action is part of a lawful exercise of the
right of self-defense,
(b) whether such action is part of a lawful exercise of
power authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of
the Charter,
(c) whether such action is part of a lawful exercise of regional power in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter,
(d) whether such action is part of a lawful exercise of
self-determination assistance at the request or with the consent of
a given people and in accordance with the principles and purposes
of the Charter, and
(e) whether such action is part of a lawful and necessary
effort to arrest those reasonably accused of international crime
over which there is universal jurisdiction.
4. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as prejudicing the provisions of the Charter or the rights and duties of
Member States or of peoples or individuals under the Charter taking into account the elaboration of rights, duties, and powers addressed in this Declaration.
5. In particular, it is emphasized that the territorial interests of States and the human rights of individuals are of a different nature and that mere consent to capture by relevant States
does not bar inquiry into the human rights of an arrested or captured person. Nonetheless, the circumstances addressed in subparagraphs (a)-(e) of paragraph 3 provide, at least, a presumption
that capture is not arbitrary.

